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INTRODUCTION 
Until recently Brazil has been a friendly environment 
for multinational corporations ["MNCs"] interested in ex-
panding their operations. After the military took control 
of Brazil in 1964, it committed itself to an ambitious 
program of social change and nationwide development -- to 
bring Brazil out of the Third World. Foreign investment was 
strongly encouraged by the government in the belief that 
such investment would play a major role in the industrial-
ization of Brazil. 
The military was successful in achieving many of its 
economic and social goals. Despite the major strides Brazil 
made, certain problems such as regional disparities, chronic 
unemployment, and a huge balance of payments deficit per-
sisted. Brazil's regulation of foreign investment, and of 
the transfer of foreign technology in particular, was in-
tended to help meet important economic goals. 
The regulations affecting high-technology MNCs in 
particular have grown increasingly more stringent and com-
plex, as the country's problems have worsened. Brazil's 
current regulatory framework makes the transfer of foreign 
technology into the country a frustrating, if not at times 
impossible, task. Whether the regulations have actually 
been successful in alleviating the economic problems they 
were intended to meet is debatable. 
This article will seek to describe Brazil's regulation 
of foreign technology. The article will also examine the 
effect of the regulations on high-technology companies in an 
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effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulations in 
meeting econ'omic goals. 
I. A HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC REVIEW 
A. Recent Political and Economic History 
Brazilian economic policy is determined almost exclu-
sively by the military regime. 1 The regulation of foreign 
investment is also determined by the regime which sets 
guidelines that it believes will further economic goals. 2 
In order to understand the government's recent economic 
policies and the current regulatory system, a brief survey 
of Brazil's recent political history and economic develop-
ment is necessary. 
In 1964, Brazil's military took control of the federal 
government and exiled the pro-left president, Joao Goulart. 3 
Since then, Brazil has been governed by a series of presi-
dents peacefully chosen from among the military leadership.4 
Under the 1967 and 1969 constitutions the legislative 
branch was virtually stripped of its powers and the execu-
tive was vested with almost unlimited control over the 
1Cf . Business International Corporation, Operating Successfully in a 
Changing Brazil 5-6 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Bus. Int'l, Operating 
Successfully] . 
2Cf . Nattier, Limitations on Marketing Foreign Technology in Brazil, 
11 Int'l Law. 437, 439 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Nattier). 
3Bus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
4Business International Corporation, Managing Successfully 
Brazil Under Pressure 14-15 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Bus. 
Managing Successfully). 
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country.S The Congress was no longer permi tted to amend 
government spending measures, and if the president deter-
mined thcrt a bill was "urgent," a prerogative frequently 
exercised in the area of economic legislation, the bill 
becomes law automatically within forty days if Congress does 
not act upon it. 6 Most importantly for foreign investors, 
the executive branch assumed an all-powerful role in deter-
mining the course of Brazil's economic development. 7 
One of the regime's justifications for the sweeping 
consti tutional and pol i tical changes was the enormous re-
building task the government set for i tsel f. 8 At the time 
of the military takeover, Brazil was faced with apparently 
insuperable economic problems: 9 the export economy was 
narrowly based on a few vulnerable agricultural products,10 
inflation was at 144 percent, and foreign capital had fled 
to more stable and productive countries. 11 
The federal government focused its centralized and 
practically unchallenged powers to mold Brazil into an 
SBus. Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 12-13. Indivi-
dual rights were also restricted by a series of laws and decrees. Id. 
at 12. In 1978, the 1969 constitution was amended to return to the 
legislative and judiciary branches some of the powers. See infra p.l04. 
6Bus . Int'l, Managing Successfully, surra note 4, at S. 
7Bus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 12. 
8Id . 
9Id . at 11-12. 
10Business International Corporation, Brazil, Investing, Licensing & 
Trading Conditions Abroad, December 1981, 32 [hereinafter cited as IL&T, 
Brazil (1981)1. 
Il Bus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note I, at 12. 
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emerging industrialized nation, the "modern miracle." As a 
result of firm and creative government policies,12 Brazil's 
economy turned around: in 1975 Brazil had the fastest 
growing manufacturing sector of any country in the world. 13 
Brazilian manufactured goods such as automobiles, auto 
parts, shoes, textiles, industrial tools, and aircraft began 
to be marketed worldwide. 14 Today Brazil has the eleventh 
largest gross domestic product in the world. 1S 
As part of its efforts to industrialize Brazil, the 
military regime encouraged the introduction of foreign 
investment. Foreign capital has been viewed as essential to 
the creation of the "modern miracle. ,,16 With the blessing 
of the forceful executive branch, MNCs flowed into Brazil in 
the mid-1960's to early 1970' s, and became predominant in 
many of Brazil's major industries. 17 18 
12Id . at 14-15. 
13Id . at 2. 
14See IL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 32. 
15Bus . Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 1. 
16Bus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 15. 
17 Cf. lL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 4. Foreign investment 
dominates the more dynamic sectors of the Brazilian economy: automotive 
industry (ninety percent foreign controlled); pharmaceuticals (eighty-
five percent); office equipment (eighty percent); chemicals and petro-
chemicals (seventy-five percent). Twenty-six of the top two hundred 
companies in Brazil (as measured by sales) are foreign controlled. 
Manufacturing has been the preferred area of foreign investment, with 
seventy-five percent of the total foreign capital. As of December 31, 
1980, the Central Bank of Brazil had recorded more than US$17.4 billion 
in direct and reinvested foreign investment. Of that total, American 
money accounted for twenty-eight percent. Id. 
18In comparison with other developing nations such as Mexico and the 
Andean Common Market countries, Brazil has few general restrictions on 
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But the perception of the role of foreign investment 
has changed because of political reforms. l9 In 1979 the 
Brazilian constitution was amended to limit the powers of 
the executive, strengthen the legislative branch, and allow 
the exercise of some civil rights. 20 The amendments herald-
ed abertura, or an opening up, a gradual democratization, 
which had been promised by current President Joao Baptista 
Figueiredo. 2l 
As a result of abertura, certain groups have become 
much more outspoken in their opposition to official poli-
cies, especially in regard to the role of foreign investment 
(footnote 18 continued) 
bringing in foreign capital. See Brazil Ponders Tight Restraints on 
Foreign Investors, 1981 Bus. Latin Am.' 98. Foreign firms usually re-
quire no special authorization to enter a local enterprise. However, 
foreign companies must register with the Central Bank within thirty days 
after entering the country to be able to make remittances outside the 
country. HNCs may acquire real estate anywhere in Brazil except in such 
strategic areas as the coastline or within 150 kilometers of the coun-
try's borders. There is presently no prohibition against foreign take-
overs although the government recently has not favored HNCs acquiring 
existing Brazilian firms unless the acquiring company brings in new 
capital and new technology. It&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 
8-10. 
19Cf . It&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 4. 
20The Europa Year Book 1692 (1982). The amendments included provis-
ions to restore an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the 
right of habeas cOrpus in political arrests. Elected officials are no 
longer subject to summary government stricture. It&T, Brazil (1981), 
supra note 10, at 2. The president retains the power to suspend consti-
tutional government in case of emergency and certain legislative prero-
gatives. The Europa Year Book 1692 (1982). The president retains the 
right to stamp a bill "urgent"; the bill becomes law if not acted upon 
by Congress within forty days. See supra p.102. 
21The Europa Year Book 1679 (1982). President Figueiredo has pro-
mised that presidential elections will be held in 1984 to choose a 
civilian successor. It&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 2. 
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in Brazil. 22 The economic dominance of MNCs has been criti-
cized by both rightist and leftist factions. Some critics 
have charged that Brazil's economic problems are caused by a 
drain on the country's natural and human resources by for-
eign firms. 23 Criticism against MNCs has mounted since 
poli tical exi les have been permitted to return and freedom 
of the press has been restored. 24 While the present admin-
istration has promised to remain firm in its support for 
continued foreign investment, the changes in Brazil's system 
of government indicate that the executive is no longer 
completely alone in determining economic policies. Despite 
the administration's present "open door" policy, the atti-
tudes of some elected officials and government critics 
towards foreign investment should not be overlooked. 
B. Major Social and Economic Concerns 
Although Brazil has made considerable progress towards 
industrialization over the past two decades, serious eco-
nomic problems remain. Regional disparities, chronic unem-
22 Brazilian Critics Censure the Role of MNCs in Economy, 1981 Bus. 
Latin Am. 13, 13. The Chamber of Deputies, analoguus to the U.S. House 
of Representatives, articulated its opposition to foreign investment 
with a proposed code of conduct for MNCs. Offenses against the code are 
vaguely defined and include "interference in domestic politics" and 
"failure to contribute to technological development." Penalties range 
from withdrawal of fiscal incentives to expulsion from the country. 
However, the code has been pending in the Senate since 1979 and eventual 
passage in its present form is unlikely. Moreover, President Figueiredo 
has vowed to veto the proposed code. IL&T, Brazi 1 (1981), supra note 
10, at 4. 
23 Brazilian Critics Censure the Role of MNCs in the Economy, 1981 
Bus. Latin Am. 13, 13. 
24 IL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 4. 
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ployment, and an enormous balance of payments deficit are 
among Brazil's most pressing economic problems, and much of 
the regulation of foreign technology is designed to correct 
problems such as these. 
1. Regional disparities 
A country larger than the continental United States, 
Brazil is divided into four broadly-drawn regions: Amazo-
25 nia, the Northeast, the West, and the Central-South. The 
regions are vastly disparate in natural resources, economic 
structure, and appeal to investors. 26 The most vivid con-
trast is between the Central-South and the Northeast. 27 
The industrialized Central-South and in particular the 
area around the city of Sao Paulo would be a "high-tech" 
company's logical first choice as headquarters and plant 
si te. 28 Sao Paulo is the hub for the distribution of raw 
materials and components, and industrial and consumer 
goods. 29 However, the extreme congestion and industrial 
pollution of the area have caused the government to make 
25Cf . Bus. Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 3. 
26Id . at 26. 
27Bus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 3. The vast 
regional disparities in economic vitality are exemplified by the differ-
ence in annual income. In the Central-South the annual per capita 
income is an estimated US$3,OOO. In the Northeast, the estimated annual 
per capita income is US$700. Bus. Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra 
note 4, at 26. 
2SBus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at S1. The 
states of the Central-South are: Minas Gerais, Parana, Rio de Janeiro, 
Rio Grande do SuI, Santa Catarina, and Sao Paulo. 
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locating in and near Sao Paulo more difficult. 30 
In comparison to the Central-South, the agrarian econ-
omy of the Northeast is largely feudalistic and stagnant. 31 
The region suffers from periodic droughts, chronic unemploy-
ment and under-employment, and a largely illiterate and 
unskilled labor force. 32 
In response to the problems of the Northeast, regional 
and federal agencies have spent billions of cruzeiros and 
have used generous tax incentives, attempting to channel 
.. . h . 33 
pr~vate ~nvestment ~nto t e reg~on. The government also 
offers incentives for investment in the undeveloped Amazonia 
region. 34 
2. Labor and unemployment 
Maintaining an acceptable employment level is consider-
ed crucial to economic and political stability in Brazil. 35 
However, the stresses on Brazil's economy and the resulting 
slowdown of the pace of industrialization have caused the 
30Id . at 82. The federal government has threatened to withhold vital 
tax incentives, see infra pp.131-133j from certain companies to force 
them to locate elsewhere. Under pressure from the government Volvo 
located its plant in Curitiba in the state of Parana and Fiat located in 
Minas Gerais. See IL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 9. 
31 Cf. Bus. Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 25j Bus. 
Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note I, at 28. The states of the 
Northeast are Alagoas, Bahia, Maranhao, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Piaui, Rio 
Grande do Norte, and Sergipe. 
32Bus . Int'I, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 25. 
33 Itl . The value of the cruzeiro as of December 31, 1982 was set at 
an official rate of Cr251.41:US$1. See Exchange Rate Outlook, 1983 Bus. 
Latin Am. 8, 8. 
34 Id . 
35 Id . at 27. 
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numbers of jobless to swell, especlally among lndustrlai 
workers traditionally not victims of unemployment. 36 MNCs' 
continued participation in Brazil's economy is consldered 
. 1 h . f . b 37 crUCla to t e creatlon 0 new)o s. 
Generally, Brazilian workers have proved to be quickly 
trainable. 38 However, the workers of the Central-South are 
as a rule better educated and have proved themselves better 
sui ted to "high-tech" .. 39 tralnlng. In contrast, plants in 
the Northeast have experienced chronic difficulties in 
recruiting qualified labor, especially since the first major 
plants to enter the region quickly hired most of the quali-
fied workers. 40 Providing "high-tech" training as well as 
skilled employment opportunities is regarded by the govern-
ment as an important advantage that new foreign enterprises 
ff th t d · . 41 can 0 ere coun ryan ltS reglons. 
3. Balance of payments and trade 
Brazil's most pressing economic problems have been the 
36Cf . id. at 27-28. Farm laborers have traditionally been unemployed 
because of cyclical fluctuations in demand. Droughts and crop failures 
in the Northeast have aggravated the unemployment/underemployment rate 
of rural workers. The government has encouraged the development of new 
farming areas outside the Northeast to attract that region's unemployed. 
Id. at 28. 
37Vellaso, A importancia das empresas multinacionais, 253 Revista 
Fovense [R. For.] 452, 453 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Vellosol. 
38Bus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 90. 
39 Id . 
40 Id . at 28-29. 
41 
Velloso, supra note 37, at 453. 
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balance of payments and balance of trade deficits. 42 In 
1979 the balance of trade deficit stood at $2.8 billion and 
in 1980 at $2.9 billion. 43 The 1980 balance of payments 
deficit was $3.5 billion. 44 The paym~nts and trade deficits 
are primarily due to the cost of servicing Brazil's huge 
international debt, the highest in the Third World, and the 
cost of heavy oil imports. 45 Until the steep increase in 
OPEC oil prices in 1973-1974, Brazil had been able to meet 
f ·· . 1 bl' . 46 most 0 ~ts ~nternat~ona 0 ~gat~ons. But Brazil's 
economy, like that of other developing nations dependent on 
OPEC oil, plunged in the mid-1970's.47 
Brazil has tried to compensate for its trade gap 
through industrialization, export diversification,48 and the 
. . fl' '1 49 U f t aggress~ve pursu~t 0 a ternat~ves to OPEC o~ . n or u-
42 Cf . Bus. Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 29. 
43 Brazil's Economy Shows Signs of Rebounding, 1981 Bus. Latin Am. 
361, 361. To the surprise of most economic observers, Brazil's trade 
balance bounced back in 1981: the first ten months showed a trade 
surplus of US$600 million. Id. No in-depth analysis of this develop-
ment has yet been published, but the change has been attributed to the 
national pressure to increase exports and the restoration of some export 
incentives. Id. See infra pp.131-33. 
44Bus . Int'], Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 34. 
45 IL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 3. The estimated cost of 
importing oil in 1981 for Brazil was ten billion dollars. Bus. Int'l, 
Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at i. 
46 Cf . Bus. Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 29. 
47 Cf . Bus. Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at Introduc-
tion. 
48 Cf. Bus. Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 36-37. 
49 Id . at 55. To decrease OPEC dependency, the Brazilian government 
has encouraged conservation, increased domestic production, diversifica-
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nately, Bra:z;il has been borrowing extensively to meet its 
goals, aggravating further the balance of payments deficit. 
Overcoming the balance of payments dilemma has become a 
national obsession. 50 The regulation of foreign technology, 
with the emphasis on limiting payments to foreign technology 
owners, mirrors this concern. 51 
II. REGULATION OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 
A. Government Policy Towards Foreign Technology 
One author has suggested there are two possible results 
of imposing a regulatory scheme controlling industrial 
property: 1) the encouragement of the introduction of new 
technology through legal protection to the title-holders of 
industrial property; ££,2) the limitation of easy access to 
new technology by granting exclusive rights to foreigners, 
unaccompanied by local development, or under financing and 
operations terms burdensome to the receiving country.52 
Chaves, a Brazilian legal scholar, asserts that Brazil 
wishes to achieve the first result. 53 Whether Brazil truly 
(footnote 49 continued) 
tion to other energy sources (shale oil, coal, alcohol, charcoal, hydro-
electric, nuclear, and solar power). Id. at 55-60. 
50Cf . id. at 29. 
51 Cf . Nattier, supra note 2, at 440. 
52 8 . Ladas, Industrial Property as a Factor in Technical Development 
and Economic Progress 5 (1973). 
53 Chaves, A importacao e a exportacao de "know-how no Bras i l, 253 R. 
For. 151, 151 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chaves]. 
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desires to meet that goal under its current regulations is 
questionable. 
High-ranking Brazilian officials certainly have not 
presented a monolithic stance in regard to foreign technol-
ogy. Severo Gomes, a former Minister of Commerce, was most 
adamant in his criticism of the intrusion of alien technol-
ogy into the country's way of life. 54 Gomes' predecessor, 
Dr. Marcus Vinicius Pratini de Moraes, voiced concern over 
the need to develop an indigenous technology more sui table 
to Brazil's particular needs. 55 
In contrast, a past Minister of Industrial Technology, 
Jose Walter Bautista Vidal, firmly supported the entry of 
foreign technology because, in his opinion, Brazil's devel-
opment needs demanded the importation of more sophisticated 
technology. 56 In 1976 Jose Paulo dos Reis Velloso, the 
54Bus . Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note I, at 106. 
55Folha de Sao Paulo, May 23, 1973, as quoted in Nattier, supra 
note 2, at 440. Dr. Moraes stated: "Many countries' poss ibili ties for 
growth are beginning to be limited by an insufficient capacity to pro-
duce their own technology and by the high cost of imported technology. 
The cost of the explicit and implicit technical content of the tech-
nology imported by Brazil last year [1972] exceeded U.S.$100 million or 
about 20% of the value of our exports. Brazil expects a greater parti-
cipation on the part of foreign companies doing business here, in 'the 
area of research and the development of technology. 
"I believe a change is urgently required in the method of transferr-
ing technology, to eliminate restriction on its use. 
"The participation of imported technology was decisive in enabling us 
to reach our present position, but the price was very high. Many comp-
anies have attained a level which permits them to reduce their depen-
dence on research done abroad. We should not attempt to create techno-
logical autarchies, because we will continue to be large importers of 
technology; but we must reduce the present gap and utilize our capacity 
to generate here a segment compatible with the level which we have 
achieved." Id. 
56 
Chaves, supra note 54, at 153. 
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Minister of Planning from 1969 to 1979,57 urged a pragmatic 
but cautious approach to transfers of technology. According 
to Velloso, Brazil is no longer primarily interested in the 
capi tal of MNCs but is more concerned with obtaining the 
technology MNCs possess. 58 
The government's Plano Basico de Desenvol vimento Cien 
tifico (Basic Plan for Scientific and Technological Develop-
ment) , a blueprint for technological development, includes 
the following statement of purpose in regard to technology: 
1) to favor the use of foreign technology by national enter-
prise, assuring the selection of the most adequate technology 
to Brazilian conditions; 
2) to create and strengthen the national science and technol-
ogy system so as to guarantee proper technological solutions 
and at the same t~, to permit a truly effective use of 
imported technology. 
Brazil has sent a message to "high-tech" MNCs: they 
will be welcome in the future if their needs and Brazil's 
needs are complementary.60 But the web of regulations that 
most affect foreign high-technology companies seems to 
insure that neither can be met. 
57The International Who's Who 1292 (1979-80). 
58 Velloso, supra note 37, at 452. According to Velloso, Brazil's new 
expectations of foreign companies are: 1) new export markets, espe-
cially for non-traditional manufactured goods; 2) contributions to the 
development of technological research in Brazil; 3) contributions to 
the decentralization of industrial development and to regional develop-
ment; 4) analysis of their [tiNCs' 1 position in the market and ther 
repercussion thereof. Id. at 453. 
Velloso submits that Brazil can offer to tiNCs: 1) new consumer mar-
kets; 2) natural resources; 3) skilled labor, adaptable to new pro-
cesses; 4) "an economic climate of reason and stability"; 5) export 
incentives; 6) tax exemptions for imported equipment. Id. 
59 Chaves, supra note 54, at 152. 
60See generally Velloso, supra note 37, at 452. 
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An exhaustive, detailed study of all laws and regula-
tions affecting foreign investment is not within the scope 
of this article. only the principal legislation and regula-
tions, their salient points, and the impact such regulations 
may have on "high-tech" companies, will be descriIJed herein. 
B. Reserve and Closed Markets 
Very few industries in Brazil have been closed com-
pletely to foreign investors. Among those closed industries 
are domestic airlines, coastal shipping, newspapers and 
certain other types of periodicals, radio and TV broadcast-
ing, fishing enterprises, and lotteries. 61 However, the 
Brazilian government has made a number of other fields 
difficul t for an MNC to operate in, especially in the high 
technology area. 62 
Resolution 9, issued by the Conselho de Desenvolvimento 
Economico (Economic Development Council), forbids governmen-
tal agencies or industries from buying capital goods from 
foreign-controlled subsidiaries unless the goods were pro-
duced in projects approved by the Council of Industrial 
Development ["CDI"] or one of the regional development 
agencies. 63 This government policy is known as the reserve 
market. 64 This regulation clearly handicaps MNCs in the 
61 IL&T, Brazil (19Bl), supra note 10, at B. 
62Cf. id. at 4. 
63Id . See infra p.129. 
64 Cf., ~, Foreign Computer Firms Are Shut Out of Brazil's Huge 
Market, 1979 Bus. Latin Am. 178, 178. 
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technology industries because the government has an effec-
tive monoploy in oil refining, the generation of hydroelec-
tric and nuclear power, telecommunications, and until re-
cently, oil exploration and extraction. 65 The government 
also takes a prominent role in steel production, iron-ore 
mining, aircraft manufacture, and the petrochemicals indus-
66 try. Government operations are also forbidden to enter 
into technicalservice contracts with foreign-controlled 
(fifty percent or more) enterprises. 67 
The computer industry and the related fields of data 
processing, software, and semiconductors have been singled 
out for special government restrictions because of the 
mili tary' s belief that unique computer systems are crucial 
to Brazil's defense. 68 Business groups have pressured the 
government to place data processing and software on the 
reserve market. 69 The semiconductor industry was designated 
for the reserve market; the government entered that industry 
itself with Transit, a Brazilian company in which the 
65I 1&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 7. Since 1979, the govern-
ment has allowed foreign oil exploration companies to search for oil, 
taking a percentage of any newly discovered deposits as payment. How-
ever, no oil has yet been found under this program. Moreover, Brazil 
has not indicated any inclination to allow private and foreign subsi-
diaries to assume control of this industry. Id. 
67 Id. at 4. Some MNCs have developed solutions to this particular 
obstacle. Lumus bought into a local company, Rockwell International 
acquired a local partner, and A.D. Little established an affiliate and 
kept less than fifty percent of the stock. Id. 
68Bus . Int'l, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 62-63. 
69Latest Brazilian Measures Presage More Obstacles for MNCs in Compu-
ter Field, 1979 Bus. Latin Am. 329, 329. 
114 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
government owns a substantial interest. 70 
The computer industry is heavily regulated and tightly 
controlled. Capre, a government agency, barred IBM's and 
Burroughs' subsidiaries from the "minicomputer" market in 
1977 and from the production of "midicomputers" in 1979. 
Capre charged that IBM and Burroughs planned to introduce 
"midicomputer" models that had insufficient locally produced 
components and that did not effectively transfer technology 
to Brazilian companies. 71 Capre has been succeeded by a new 
and more powerful agency, the Secretariado Especial de 
lnformacao ["SEl"). SEI is charged with overseeing all 
computer development and even has the power to control 
production schedules. 72 
Recently the government has retreated from its hardline 
nationalist position in regard to the computer industry. In 
1980 SEl granted permission for a number of MNCs to begin 
production on previously blocked projects. 73 IBM do Brasil, 
for example, was allowed to begin production on medium-sized 
computers. Some of the computers were intended for Brazil, 
the rest were intended for the export market. This change 
70 Cf. Brazil Sets Aside Semiconductor Production for National Firms, 
1981 Bus. Latin Am. 114, 115. 
71 Foreign Computer Firms Are Shut Out of Brazil's Huge Market, 1979 
Bus. Latin Am. 178, 178. 
72 Brazil Approves New NNC Projects in Computer Sector, 1980 Bus. 
Latin Am. 343, 344. 
73 Id . Hewlett-Packard was granted permission to produce a "micro-
computer." Id. at 344. Phillips of Holland had been manufacturing 
integrated circuits solely for export, and was allowed to increase 
production and sell the increase on the Brazilian market. Id. 
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in position was presumably made because IBM was the only 
company in Brazil, domestic or foreign, with the technical 
and financial resources to begin production almost immedi-
ately.74 One reason suggested for the government's reversal 
of policy regarding IBM and other companies was that 
Brazilian-owned enterprises could not meet domestic demand, 
and importing computers was an unacceptable al ternati ve. 75 
Opponents of the closed market policy point out that 
Brazil does not yet have the capital or technical skills to 
support completely indigenous high-technology. The closed 
market policy therefore will not lead to technological 
independence. 76 For instance, the highly successful govern-
ment-run computer company, Cobra, has not developed its own 
technology, but instead assembles imported components, 
selling the finished units at three times the international 
price. 77 
Brazil has been willing to use overpriced and often 
outdated technology to keep MNCs out of the computer indus-
try. Of course, outdated technology cannot effectively 
compete in the export markets, and thus hinders the balance 
78 of payments goals of the government. Such technology also 
74Id . at 343-44. 
75Cf . id. at 344. 
76 F . C F' A Sh 0 f B '1' H M k t orel.gn omputer l.rms re ut ut 0 razl. ~ __ ., uge ar e • 
Bus. Latin Am. 178, 178-79. 
77 Id . at 179. 
1979 
78Latest Brazilian Measures Presage More Obstacles for MNCs in Comp~~ 
ter Field, 1979 Bus. Latin Am. 329, 330. 
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is unlikely to be unique for military purposes. 
C. Profit Remittances 
The transfer of profits, dividends, and payments for 
technology are regulated primarily by Law No. 4131 of Sep-
tember 27, 1962, known as the Profit Remittance Law. 79 
Under this law, which is an important control on interna-
tional payments, no company operating in Brazil may legally 
remit profits or other payments abroad until it has regis-
tered its capital with the Central Bank of Brazil and has 
. d . 80 Th .. f pa1 lncome taxes. e prov1s1on 0 most consequence to 
"high-tech" MNCs is the ban on payments for patents and 
trademark licenses to licensors that directly or indirectly 
control the licensee. 81 Payments under technical-assistance 
contracts82 are permitted, but a subsidiary cannot claim 
such payments as income tax deductions. 83 
79Law No. 4131. of Sept. 3. 1962. [1962] Colecao das Leis, Atos do 
Poder Legislativo [Colecao] V 117-24. as amended ~ Law No. 4390, of 
August 29. 1964. [1964] Colecao V 97-99. 
801L&T. Brazil (1981). supra note 10. at 14. 
81 1d . A Brazilian company is regarded as foreign controlled "when-
ever at least 50% of the voting shares of the Brazilian company belong, 
ei ther directly or indirectly. to the foreign company." See Daniel, 
Licensing in Brazil (pts. 1-5). 74 Pat. & Trademark Rev. 147~87. 227. 
284. 326, 288 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Daniel, Licensing in Brazil]. 
For a discussion of some of the difficulties faced in determining 
whether a patent licensor is directly or indirectly "connected" to a 
licensor. see id. at 288-89. 
82Technical-assistance contracts are normally for some form of 
"secret. proprietary information which is not patented. including pro-
cess and product engineering, drawings, formulae, operating manuals and 
many other kinds of information." See Nattier. supra note 2, at 446; 
~ generally infra pp.120-121 & note 94. 
83Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, supra note 81, at 288 . Due to the 
restrictions on royalty remittances, most technology agreements between 
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As a result of the Profit Remittance Law, there are 
only two forms of organizational structures by which foreign 
owners of technology can introduce their products into 
Brazil. They may either set up a wholly-owned subsidiary 
and hope to remit technology payments as profits, or the 
technology-holders can sell the "know-how" to a company in 
which the seller has a minority or no interest in the equi-
t 84 y. Of course, a third option is to pass up investing in 
Brazil altogether, thus keeping the technology out of the 
country.8S 
When entering a Brazilian enterprise, only cash and 
equipment are recognized as "qualified" equity under the 
Profit Remittance Law. But some foreign companies have 
acquired minority interests in Brazilian companies by in-
vesting their "know-how" as equity, to decrease cash outlays 
and to receive technology payments as dividends. To receive 
such treatment, the foreign companies have entered into 
"gentlemen's agreements" with the Brazilian patent office, 
the Insti tuto Nacional de Propriedade Industrial [" INPI"] . 
As a general practice, the patent office requires in addi-
(footnote 83 continued) 
Brazilian companies and their foreign parents are now for technical 
assistance, rather than the use of patents. This trend has caused 
concern among Brazilian officials. Id. at 289. 
The ban on remittances for patent and trademark licenses is reite-
rated in Normative Act No. 15, a set of guidelines issued by the Bra-
zilian patent office. See infra p.120 & notes 92-93. 
84Nattier, supra note 2, at 442. 
85 Cf. Daniel, Technology Transfer and Patent License Litigation in 
Brazil, 78 Pat. & Trademark Rev. 503, 517 (I 980) [hereinafter cited as 
Daniel, Technology Transfer Litigation). 
118 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
tion to the technology some cash or equipment investment in 
new ventures, usually ten percent of the Brazilian company's 
I . 1 86 tota cap~ta. 
D. Registration of Foreign Technology 
The Brazilian patent office, the Instituto Nacional de 
Propriedade Industrial, is charged with registering Bra-
zilian patents and all agreements for the use of foreign 
87 patents, trademarks, and unpatented "know-how." 
created by Law No. 5648 of December 11, 1970. 
INPI was 
Under Law 
No. 5648 INPI was granted powers to adopt measures to accel-
erate and regulate the transfer of technology and to provide 
better conditions for the negotiation and exploitation of 
patents. 88 INPI is more than a registry of patents and 
patent agreements: it has also become a framer of industri-
al policy.89 The courts have upheld this interpretation of 
INPI's role, and have confirmed INPI's power to demand tech-
nology agreements more attuned to the national interest. 90 
86IL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 14. Companies capitalizing 
their technology do so by the following process: "a normal licensing 
contract is drawn up between the supplier of technology and the Brazil-
ian joint venture, to be approved by INPI. The foreign firm's intention 
of capitalizing payment received as investment in the joint venture is 
not mentioned. The payments are not remitted, but are incorporated into 
the assets of the joint venture, and the amounts are registered with the 
Central Bank as an investment by the foreign partner." Id. 
87D . 1 an1e , Licensing in Brazil, supra note 81, at 285. 
88 Law No. 5648, of Dec. 11, 1970, [1970] Colecao VII 83-84. See also 
Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, supra note 81, at 285. 
89 Cf . Daniel, Technology Transfer Litigation, supra note 85, at 506. 
90Judgment of Mar. 19, 1980, Setimo Tribunal Federal, Rio de Janeiro, 
as described in Daniel, Technology Transfer Litigation; Judgment of 
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The present Code of Industrial Property [the "Code"), 
Law No. 5722 of December 21, 1970, consists primarily of 
broad limitations on the remittances of royalties for patent 
and trademark licenses. 91 Normative Act No. 15 of Septem-
ber 11, 1975 ["Act No. 15"] was issued by INPI pursuant to 
the code. 92 According to INPI, Act No. 15 was issued to 
encourage the transfer of suitable technology, to facilitate 
the processing of agreements, and to advise parties to such 
agreements on how to adapt the terms of their contracts to 
. 1 . 1 . l' d 1 . 93 BraZ1 1an eg1s at10n an po 1Cy. 
Normative Act No. 15 classifies technology transfer 
agreements into five categories, and sets forth the permis-
sible terms for each category of agreement. The five cate-
gories are: 1) patent licenses, 2) trademark licenses, 3 ) 
agreements for furnishing industrial technology, 4) agree-
(footnote 90 continued) 
Nov. 27, 1979, Primeiro Tribunal Federal, Rio de Janeiro, as described 
in id. 
91Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, supra note 81, at 285. 
92Ato Normativo [Normative Act) No. 15, of Sept. 11, 1975, 256 
Revista da Propriedade Industrial (September 1975). The full text of 
Normative Act No. 15 is translated into English at Daniel, Licensing in 
Brazil, supra note 81, at 147, and is hereinafter cited to that source. 
According to Daniel, Normative Act No. 15 might be better described 
as a "Directive rather than an Act because it is 'an authoritative 
instrument that promulgates a program or regulation or directs or pro-
hibits certain acts and is issued by a high-level official body or 
competent official as a broad policy statement to be developed by tech-
nicians or as an explicit instruction with details'." Id. at 148. 
93Id . at 152. Normative Act No. 15 expands and clarifies many of the 
provisions included in the Industrial Property Code. In describing the 
regulatory framework, reference will generally only be made to Act 
No. 15, since it is the latter and more explicit articulation of govern-
ment policy in the area. 
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ments for technical-industrial cooperation,S) agreements 
for specialized technical services. 94 Only one category may 
be the subject of any registered agreement. 95 
Normative Act No. 15 requires the registration of 
agreements with INPI whenever the parties are both domiciled 
in Brazil, when the provider of the technology is domiciled 
abroad, or when the provider of the technology is domiciled 
in Brazil. 96 After the parties enter a technology transfer 
contract, the contract must be registered with and approved 
by INPI. If remittances or tax deductions are planned, the 
INPI registration and the agreement must also be submitted 
to the Central Bank which will issue a "Certificate of 
Registration." Both steps are prerequisites to making any 
94Id . at 153. The Act defines the first two categories as agreements 
for the specific purpose of authorizing the use of patent or trademark 
rights by another. See id. at 154, 187. The last three categories 
encompass agreements for the use of unpatented technical "know-how" and 
are generally referred to in Brazil as "technical-assistance" contracts. 
See supra p.117 & note 82. 
An agreement to furnish industrial technology is an agreement to 
transfer knowledge and techniques used in the production of "consumer 
goods or of inputs in generaL" See Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, supra 
note 81, at 191. Any aggreement to acquire necessary knowledge and 
related services to manufacture industrial capital equipment made to 
order is an "agreement for technical-industrial cooperation." Id. at 
198. 
Finally, an "agreement for specialized technical services" is defined 
as such when its purpose is "the planning, the progranuning and the 
elaboration of studies and projects, as well as the carrying out of or 
rendering of services, of a specialized nature, which are required by 
the 'productive system' of the country [Brazill." Id. at 227. 
Technical services agreements which are not "inherant to the pro-
ductive system" need not be registered. Id. at 153. 
95Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, supra note 81, at 153. 
96 Id. at 154. Registry requirements apparently do not apply to 
agreements between foreign parties. Id. at 149. 
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remittances abroad or claiming tax deductions. 97 
Under Act No. 15, regular invention patent licenses run 
f f ' f 98 or ~ teen years. No fixed term is set for technical-
assistance contracts. The term for specialized technical-
services is that time which is "considered necessary for the 
rendering of the services by the technicians, the submission 
f h ' , ' f h d k' 99 o t e proJect or the term~nat~on 0 t e un erta lng." 
Terms for industrial technology agreements and agreements 
for technical-industrial cooperation are det,ermined by the 
time needed "to 'dominate' (become fully conversant with)" 
the transferred technology.lOO Technical-industrial cooper-
ation agreements are limited to five years, with the POSS1-
bility of extension. lOl No such limit is imposed on indus-
trial technology agreements. l02 
With the exception of agreements for specialized tech-
nical services, technology transfer agreements are based on 
a percentage of net sales or fixed amount per unit of the 
product. 103 INPI 's practice has been to limit payments to 
97See id. at 286. See supra p.117. 
98 See Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, ~ra note 81, at 157. Licenses 
for use of utility model patents and industrial design patents are 
limi ted to ten yea rs . I d . 
99 Id . at 230. 
100Id. at 195, 201. 
101 ld . at 201. 
102 Id . at 195. Act No. 15 does not specify a fixed term for trade-
mark license agreements, but the Industrial Property Code imposes a 
ten-year limit on such a license. Id. at 150. 
103 Id . at 155, 188, 193, 199. 
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f ' 104 1 ve percent of net sal es. These limits apply only to 
the amounts converted into foreign currency for remittancE: 
abroad. If the payments remain in Brazil no INPI authoriza-
tion is needed, al though no tax deductions are permi t,ted for 
t b th 'b d '1' 105 paymen s a ove e prescrl e cel lngs. Payment for 
specialized technical services is set at a fixed price, 
based on demonstrated cost. l 06 If the cost of specialized 
services is less than $20,000, a formal agreement is not 
needed: an itemized invoice is sufficient. l07 
Maintaining confidentiality is very important to the 
developers of competitive industrial "know-how. ,,108 How-
ever, according to Act No. 15, patent license agreements and 
specialized technical services contracts may not contain 
clauses restricting the free use of the transmitted informa-
tion and data after the expiration of the patent or term of 
the contract. l09 Agreements for technical-lndustria1 coop-
eration or industrial technology may not include clauses 
barring the free use of the technology after the end of a 
reasonable period, counted from "each one of the last item 
104Nattier, supra note 2, at 446. INPI reduced the maximum percent-
age allowed when Normative Act No. 15 was issued. Before the Act, the 
percentage had been based on gross sales. Id. 
105 See Bus. Int '1, Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 97-99. 
106See Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, ~lJpra note 81, at 229. 
107Id . at 227. 
108N ' 2 451 att1er, supra note "at , 
1090 '1 a01e , Licensing in Brazil, supra note 81, at 158, 231. 
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of information which was transmitted. 1I110 Nattier, a patent 
attorney, proposed that INPI may be willing to accept secre-
cy clauses that forbid the technology recipient from making 
any general disclosures for a specified period after the 
last transfer of technology, if convincing arguments can be 
made for the need for such clauses. 111 
INPI has generally not permitted the inclusion of any 
clause restricting export markets in technology agree-
ments. 112 However, Normative Act No. 15 allows for clauses 
which exclude the purchaser of the technology from selling 
its product in certain markets, if such exclusion is permit-
ted or required by industrial property legislation of the 
country of the provider of the technology or is required by 
an International Act or Agreement to which Brazil is a 
party. 113 INPI has recognized in Act No. 15 that many 
countries. perrni t the owner of patented technology or a 
trademark to prevent the importation of goods produced under 
the same patent or trademark in other countries. 114 
In 1978 INPI revised the approval process for technol-
ogy agreements. The agency introduced the use of the "prior 
consultation letter," modeled on the carta consulta (consult 
letter) , used by other governmental agencies. 
110 Id. at 198, 204. 
I11N . 2 452 att~er, supra note ,at . 
112Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, supra note 81, at 234. 
113Id . at 158, 190-91: 197, 204. 
114Id . at 234-35. 
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allows a company to test INPI' s reactions to an agreement 
before all the terms have been worked out between the par-
ties. Under this procedure, a company can send INPI a 
resume of its maj or proposals. INPI officials will then 
determine whether the proposed agreement would be likely to 
be approved if submitted formally. This procedure can speed 
up substantially the INPI negotiation process. 115 
INPI wields broad discretionary powers in the adminis-
tration of existing technology regulation. 116 In order for 
a high-technology company to draft acceptable technology 
transfer agreements, the concerns of INPI and its officials 
must be understood. Dr. Guilherme Hatab, the President of 
INPI when Normative Act No. 15 was issued, outlined two 
maj or purposes of the Act. The first is to insure that 
Brazilian companies importing technology become technologi-
cally autonomous through the generation of their own tech-
nology, the preservation of their internal decision-making 
powers, and the acquisition of the personnel and materials 
necessary to fully assimilate foreign technology. The 
second purpose is to avoid overburdening the balance of 
payments with unnecessary imported technology.117 
The concern for the balance of payments has also been 
emphasized by Dr. Nelson Fagundes de Mello, Attorney General 
for INPI. According to Dr. Mello, technology transfer 
US See Bus. Int'1. Managing Successfully, supra note 4, at 100. 
116See generally id. at 99-101. 
117N . 2 44 att1er, supra note ,at 1. 
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agreements with foreign entities are inexorably linked to 
government policy regarding balance of payments. Dr. Mello 
contended that INPI is vested with the power to regulate and 
to restrict technology transfers which burden the balance of 
payments. 118 At least two courts have upheld Dr. Mello's 
interpretation of INPI's role. 119 
INPI's concern with the balance of payments seems to be 
wedded to an underlying suspicion that Brazilian companies 
are overcharged and disadvantaged in agreements with foreign 
companies. 120 Regardless of the validity of INPI's suspi-
cion, INPI's overly protective attitude toward Brazilian 
businesses could be denying them the competitive technology 
needed for the export markets. 121 For example, the plain-
tiff in Judgment of Nov. 27,1979, a Brazilian enterprise, 
argued that the delays caused by INPI' s disapproval of a 
patent l~cense agreement in effect gave a market advantage 
to MNCs who could bring in similar technology without INPI 
approval. 122 Such a result sharply contradicts the national 
goal of developing an indigenous, independent technology.123 
118D . 1 an1e , Technology Transfer Litigation, supra note 85, at 505-06. 
119 Id . at 512, 516. 
120Cf . Nattier, supra note 2, at 441; Bus. Int'l, Operating Success-
fully, supra note 1, at 103. 
121 Cf . Daniel, Technology Transfer Litigation, supra note 85, at 517. 
122See id. at 505. 
123 
To bypass INPI MNCs must be willing to forgo payments from their 
Brazilian affiliates. See ~upra p.117. 
However, bypassing INPI could be risky since the Industrial Property 
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A company must be ready to invest a great deal of time 
and to go through cumbersome and extensive paper work in 
order to obtain approval from INPI. 124 INPI is understaffed 
and lacks personnel who are able to understand highly tech-
nical agreements. 125 
In its approvals INPI seems to give preference to 
companies in critical industries, but there are no guaran-
tees of favorable treatment. 126 Many MNCs, unable to obtain 
approval for technical-assistance contracts, have reluctant-
ly decided to continue to supply their subsidiaries with new 
technological advances at no charge to the subsidiaries to 
enable them to continue to compete. 127 
One American high-technology company successfully 
collected royal ties above the five percent ceiling through 
an innovative, albeit complex scheme. The company's subsi-
diary, a joint venture, eighty percent controlled by the 
parent, was not interested in remitting royal ties to its 
parent, but it did want to claim tax deductions of over five 
percent for the royalties. 128 
(footnote 123 continued) 
Code requires that all acts or contracts for the transfer of technology 
must be registered with INP!. See Daniel, Licensing in Brazil, ~~i! 
note 81, at 286. 
124B 1'1 M . S f 11 4 t 98 100 us. nt , anaglng uccess u y, supra note ,a - . 
125See IL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 14. 
126 Cf . Bus. Int'l, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 104. 
127 Cf. id. 
128 l1NC in Brazil Mana~_~~ Clear Ro~ Payment Hurdle. 1 o~, :- .. ; 
Latin Am. 385, 385. 
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The process of approving such royal ties began over 
eleven years ago when the American company registered in 
Brazil its American patents for its product and the machine 
used in producing that product. The patent rights were not 
granted until 1978. In the meantime, to circumvent the ban 
on payments to parent companies, the parent formed a joint 
venture with local investors, retaining for itself an eighty 
percent interest. When the rights were finally granted, the 
American company transferred the patent rights to the Bra-
zilian affiliate. The affiliate hired patent attorneys and 
began to negotiate with INPI as to the scale of percentage 
to be allowed as payment. The patent attorneys advised 
applying for separate approvals for the two components: the 
product and the machine. Negotiations lasted over a year, 
but the company was permitted to collect three percent on 
each, obtaining an effective six percent royalty on the 
finished product. 129 This company's experiences exemplify 
the persistence needed to maneuver through Brazil's compli-
cated and restrictive patent licensing procedures. 
E. Investment Incentive Programs 
Over the years, Brazil has offered generous investment 
incentives to MNCs, including special incentives in the 
high-technology fields. 130 Today, however, Brazil offers no 
particular benefits for "high-tech" companies that would 
offset the stringent transfer of technology regulations. In 
129 Id . 
130 See Bus. lnt' I, Operating Successfully, supra note 1, at 90. 
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general, the government incentive policies have been diffi-
cult to follow, but all are aimed at easing Brazil's eco-
. bl 131 
nom~c pro ems. 
After years of generous programs, the government· is now 
adopting a more laissez-faire philcsophy in its incentive 
programs. 132 Principal incentive plans are now available in 
two broad categories: 1) regional and sector incentives,133 
d) .. 134 an 2 export ~ncent~ve programs. Some minor incentives 
dm ·· db' f . 135 are a ~n~stere y a var~ety 0 agenc~es. 
1. Regional incentive programs 
Regional incentive programs are administered by the 
respective regional development agencies, Sudene in the 
Northeast, Sudam in Amazonia. Sudene can provide benefits 
for both agricultural and industrial projects. Sudam only 
provides benefits for agricultural projects. The incentives 
include income tax credits, reductions on import duties and 
other taxes on imported equipment and occasionally raw 
materials, and federal tax holidays for five to twenty 
years.136 
The regional programs grant preferential treatment to 
Brazilian-owned companies. Sudene and Sudam employ a point 
131See supra pp.109-110. 
132Cf . IL&T, Brazil (1981), supra note 10, at 21. 
133 Id . at 21-22, 34. 
134Id . at 34-35. 
135See gener~ id. at 21-24. 
136 Id . at 21-22. 
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system to the decision-making process to determine the 
project's priority classification. Points are based on such 
factors as the type of industry, location of the proj ect, 
possibilities for import-substitution, export potential, use 
of local raw materials, and the creation of new jobs. 13 7 
Both Sudam and Sudene are presently emphasizing ex-
ports. Both agencies now favor a few large-scale projects 
rather than a host of smaller,enterprises. Sudene in parti-
cular stresses projects that are more technology-intensive. 
For example, metallurgy, and the chemical and textile indus-
tries are preferred to the leather and wood working projects 
approved in the past. 138 
The federal government has set up a free trading zone 
in Manaus in Amazonia. Certain companies have been able to 
ship their components to the area and have the units assem-
bled in Manaus at a low enough cost to offset the high cost 
of distribution to the other parts of Brazil. For some 
companies, the substantial tax waivers and other benefits 
have overcome the disadvantages of distance. 139 
The distance and isolation of the Northeast and Amazo-
nia make the two regions generally unappealing for a "high-
tech" investor. The distance from the industrial and popu-
lation centers of the South creates difficulties in obtain-
ing supplies and distributing finished products. Because of 
137Id . at 22. 
138Id . 
139Id . at 34. 
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the lack of adequate skilled labor in either area, many wor-
kers must be imported from the southern parts of Brazil. 140 
The types of regional projects with the best prognosis 
of success are "those that use locally available resources, 
are geared to the regional or exports markets and are capi-
tal intensive. 1I141 One might well question how effective 
regional development programs have been in encouraging 
technology-intensive industries to locate in the Northeast 
or Amazonia, correcting the chronic employment problems of 
those regions, and improving the way of life for the average 
nordestino or caboclo. 
2. Export incentives 
In the export incentives area, Brazil has been quite 
generous, so generous that some nations have charged that 
Brazil subsidizes its export industries. 142 Exports are 
encouraged by the following principal mechanisms: the 
Befiex and ~ programs, the Imposto de Produtos Industri-
ais (Tax on Manufactured Products) ["IPI") tax credit, and 
subsidized credit for exporters. 143 Of course, the programs 
under the regional development agencies and other government 
programs also encourage exports. 
Under the Befiex and Ciex programs Brazil provides 
incentives for manufacturers of export goods. 
140Id . at 23. 
141 Id . 
142Id . at 34. 
143Id . at 34-35. 
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aimed primarily at large-scale projects; Ciex was designed 
to benefit small and medium-sized companies. Both programs 
offer large reductions (up to ninety percent) in import 
duties and large reductions in Brazil's value-added tax, 
IPI. A positive trade balance is required for any company 
t t ·· t' . h f' . 144 o par 1c1pa e 1n e1t er Be 1ex or C1ex. 
Besides the Befiex and Ciex benefits, exporters are 
also entitled to an IPI tax credit. This credit entitles 
the manufacturer to claim a IPI tax credit against other 
taxes even though the IPI tax was not levied. The IPI tax 
credi t in combination wi th the Befiex and Ciex programs 
essentially rewards qualified manufacturers twice. 145 
Generous credit arrangements are becoming the preferred 
government incentive to motivate high export levels. For 
1982, 750 billion cruzeiros have been set aside for this 
purpose. A variety of credit programs are available for 
such needs as pre- and post-shipment credits, export financ-
ing and refinancing, and financing for capital goods, con-
sumer durables, advertising, and other promotional activi-
ties. 146 
Many other smaller investment incentive programs are 
available, offered by federal, state, and local governments, 
but Brazilian firms are preferred for such benefits as a 
144Id . at 34. 
145Id . 
146Id . at 35. 
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rule. 147 
The national pressure to defeat payment deficits by 
boosting exports is obvious in examining Brazil's incentive 
programs. The incentives have been successful to a certain 
degree in increasing exports and improving the balance of 
trade. 148 Unfortunately, the incentive proC]rams have not 
yet succeeded in alleviating unemployment or meeting the 
needs of the more uneconomically depressed areas of Brazil. 
The incentives do not promote the development of a 
world-competi ti ve indigenous technology. The government's 
programs will not offset the stringent regulation of foreign 
technology. 
CONCLUSION 
Ti tle-holders of foreign technology have been discour-
aged from entering Brazil because they. receive few incen-
tives to bring in their "know-how," they are barred from 
critical industries, and are substantially disadvantaged by 
the regulatory scheme. Therefore, the network of law, 
regulations, and programs deny Brazil access to the technol-
ogy it needs to reach its desired economic objectives. 
Reserve and closed market policies in high-technology 
fields have not proved use·ful in alleviating the balance of 
payments deficit. Because MNCs are forbidden to enter 
certain fields and Brazilian companies lack the capital and 
147 Id. at 22-24, 35. 
148 See supra p.109 & note 43. 
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"know-how" to enter such fields, the reserve market may be 
denying Brazilians job opportunities as well. 
The Profit Remittance Law and the technology registra-
tion regulations have made foreign-based "high-tech" bUS1-
nesses less profi t.able in Brazil thaIl in other countr1es. 
If a MNC chooses to introduce lts technology 111 Brazil, the 
administration of the regulations requires the company to 
devote considerable effort to government red tape and t.o 
write off much of the expense of developIng the technology. 
If the company chooses to forgo investIng In BrazIl because 
of the high financial and time cost, Brazll is denIed the 
technology it desires, Brazil discourages the creation i..'f 
new jobs in new technology enterprises, and products that 
can compete in world markets are not developed. 
With the exception of Sudene's growing preference for 
more technological industries, none of Brazil's incentive 
agencies have set up programs that wIll encourage "high-
tech" industries. Exports have been encouraged, but tech-
nology is necessary to assure the competitive quality of 
what is manufactured, to assure that Brazil exports products 
other than the raw materials less developed countries have 
traditionally exported. Regional development has been 
encouraged, but the infrastructure necessary for industrial-
ization is not yet in place in Amazonia or the Northeast. 
Brazil's government has committed itself to continued 
technological and economic growth. But the existing tech-
nology regulations cannot attain the intended objectives. A 
134 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
comprehensive national policy that would better serve both 
~razil's and MNCs' needs is badly needed. Further technolo-
gical advancement should be regulated so as to take advan-
tage of the resources of Brazil's people and the different 
regions, fully recognizing their liabilities and strengths, 
to develop exports fully competitive in a highly technologi-
cal world. 
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